

An excellent history...
Fantastic Presentation of the German ViewpointKershaw takes a logical method of breaking the battle down into pieces, and has added new insights to each section of the battle. Some parts are slightly sketchier than others, but I suppose that's due to the lack of available information. The book also has several series of photographs, though Kershaw takes the somewhat annoying tack of describing each photograph in the text as well -- one picture is worth a thousand words. Lastly, the author disputes the theory that the British 1st Airborne would have held the Arnhem bridge if they had landed closer to it.
Eine Brücke auch weitCertainly "It Never Snows In September" is not written a la Ryan or Ambrose - so if you need your history slick and stylish this is probably not for you - but it is readable and fun to read. Kershaw is a military man by training not a writer like Ryan or Ambrose and given that fact "It Never Snows" is actually a quite good read. It's not simple a dry treatise of facts, there is heart and sole. If you want to know more about Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, and want to have fun learning about it, I suggest combining "A Bridge Too Far" and "It Never Snows in September" as a tag-team. These two books alone will give you your fix and them some. "It Never Snows" is currently out of print and getting a copy will cost you (unless you can find one in a library somewhere) but it's worth every cent!!!


Excellent BiographyKershaw's keen sense of understanding mixed with detailed research has brought forth a well documented book; one that's beautifully laid out and easy to use as a research tool. The chapters, "list of works cited" along with "notes" help the reader to go back into the annals of history to locate the material used in this work. This work outlines his beginnings and uses previously unpublished material to take you into the minds of those closest to him.
Hitler was a masterful speaker and used his talents to build up the citizens of Germany giving them what they desired - self worth, obligation and a sense of duty. Germany was crying out to be rescued from a post war depression; so he took the country by the throat and pulled it from the ashes to rise like a majestic phoenix.
Adolf Hitler - a little known corporal from World War I, who believed he survived a mustard gas attack by divine intervention, rose to power and unleashed the might of the German army unto the world.
This book is a remarkable achievement and my hat is off to Mr Kershaw for all his hard work. This is an excellent biography filled with insight!
Heil Hubris!...Keeping with the recent tradition exemplified by Peter Fritzsche's GERMANS INTO NAZIS, the new view of Hitler is that he can no longer be seen as the author of his own destiny. Mr Kershaw says plainly that modern biographies of Hitler cannot answer questions about the man by focusing exclusively on him, but only by analyzing German society. He does not go as far as Daniel Goldhagen did in HITLERS WILLING EXECUTIONERS where, unintentionally, Hitler is 'excused', by blaming rabid anti-semitism on the ordinary German.
Mr Kershaw has little interest in psychological theories (particularly psychosexual ones), as explanations for Hitler's behavior. He refers to them but generally says that they are incidental to any true understanding, especially since there is insufficient information available. One such theory is that Hitler's anti-semitism stemmed from the illicit liaison of his grandmother which produced Alois - Hitler's father. Proponents say that Hitler's grandfather may have been a Jew, Kershaw simply says that the "baptismal register left a blank in the space allocated to the baby's father. The name of Hitler's paternal grandfather was not disclosed and, despite much speculation, has remained unknown ever since."
Some of the themes that are developed by Mr Kershaw are as follows:
POLITICAL GOOD FORTUNE and OPPORTUNISM. Hitler's portrayal of himself as a man of political convictions in MEIN KAMPF, is meretricious as, Mr Kershaw shows, rather than acting with intent, or being a triumph of the will, Hitler was simply the master of taking advantage of opportunity. The revolutionary incidents in Munich in 1919 and Hitler's attempted revolt against the national government in 1923, are actually "shaped by circumstance, opportunism, good fortune and, not least, the backing of the army...Hitler did not come to politics, but politics came to him."
GOVERNANCE. One of the consequences of this opportunism is that it had an effect on how Hitler governed. The greatest feat of Hitler's political career was his maneuvering himself into the position of Reich Chancellor in 1933. Precipitously "the 'nobody of Vienna', 'unknown soldier', beerhall demagogue, head of what was for years no more than a party of the lunatic fringe of politics, a man with no credentials for running a complicated state machine...had now been placed in charge of government of one of the leading states in Europe." The result was that there was a state "without any central coordinating body and with a head of government, largely disengaged..."
POWER is the central thread that runs throughout HUBRIS and connects all of Mr Kershaw's themes together. He says, "what has continued in the writing of the book to interest me, is not just how this initially most unlikely pretender to high state office could gain power, but how he was able to extend that power until it became absolute."
'WORKING TOWARDS THE FUHRER.' Mr Kershaw is at his brilliant best in developing this theme. The words were spoken by Hitler's agriculture minister in a speech in 1934. In arguing that it was not possible for Hitler to order from above, everything that was required, the people should therefore cease to await such orders. Mr Kershaw states what was said next. "Rather, however, it is the duty of every single person to attempt, in the spirit of the Fuhrer, to work towards him." This spurred a new type of voluntarism by the people, and also set off a struggle between state agencies in the competition for influence. There was a concomitant progression towards the primacy of politics and politics also became increasingly violent. This setting "invited radical initiatives from below." The origins of the final solution for the Jews can be seen in this context. In general, and in conclusion, working towards the Fuhrer enabled Hitler to accomplish things he wanted done without relying on institutional apparatus. This only served to strengthen his personal mastery and power over party, state, and the people.
Biography should be written by an acute enemy (Arthur James Balfour)
We all qualify as enemies of Hitler but only a few could write a biography to match this one.
A Landmark Biography

Not quite sure about this one...A bigger problem might come from the plot, which is not exactly my thing, and also the way it jumps about in time and place. Some parts are fast-moving - one minute the protagonist is in New York, the next in HK - but in other places she is dwelling on her abandoned children for whole paragraphs, without saying anything new.
Apart from the iffy plot, the characters were not very well fleshed out: just drawn to 'type' I think. I found the final scene with the ex-husband ludicrous in the extreme. Then the next thing you know she is back in New York and everything is happening all at once again.
Otherwise the actual writing is not to bad - the short, blunt sentences will appeal to some readers. And it was nice to see a book set in Hong Kong that was more or less accurate (except for standing up on a mini bus which is not allowed!).
Important book
Good story - Hong Kong settingStrong writing - good believeable characters. It doesn't try too hard or overreach like many books with this setting. I was drawn right in, and taken by the story. And then I was so sorry it had ended. It's really about being a parent. And about loyalty.
I recommend it to anyone even if they aren't interested in the setting and in fact am going to buy another copy right now to give as a gift.


Was German Victory Really Possible on D-Day?D-Day: Piercing the Atlantic Wall consists of 17 chapters and three appendices. The page breakdown consists of 25% on preparations for D-Day, 60% on events on D-Day, 10% concerning events after D-Day and 5% on conclusions. This organization seems at odds with the author's stated intent to cover the nine-day battle to establish a viable bridgehead, since only one chapter is devoted to events after D-Day and even that chapter only covers the period 7-9 June. This may be the result of severe editing, but it is surely a departure from the book's stated purpose. Nevertheless, the text is superbly supported by many excellent photographs, diagrams and military-friendly maps.
Kershaw provides a wealth of information on the German situation from diary and archival sources. For example, I was unaware of the size or extent of the counterattack by the 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment against the Utah Beach landing on the evening of D-Day, since this is not even mentioned in most other accounts. The exact dispositions of the German coastal defense units covering the invasion beaches - often vague in other accounts - are spelled out in great detail here. However, readers should note that units that lack survivors who wrote diaries or letters are under-represented in this account. The German 91st Luftlande Division for example, is barely mentioned in this account despite its key role in the fighting around St Mère Eglise.
On the Allied side, Kershaw provides some interesting accounts but there is much less depth or detail. It is odd than not only are most Allied corps and division commanders ignored, but even well-known D-Day heroes such as Brigadier General Cota and Colonel Taylor - who helped to motivate the breakout from Omaha Beach - do not appear once in these pages. Despite the author's claim to examine the nine-day battle, there is no mention of any Allied follow-on divisions that landed during this period. The one chapter that covers the fighting after D-Day virtually ignores the link-up of the various Allied beaches and fails to note the "almost" British 7th Armored Division breakthrough at Villers-Bocage on 13 June. Yet while Kershaw's book lacks detail on the Allied side, it does help to dispel some of the myth of German tactical superiority in the Second World War. Kershaw notes," on 6 June the German defenses lacked edge. Although subsequent fighting in Normandy was to demonstrate a keener capability, it was not there during the battle of D-Day." In particular, the lackluster performance of the 21st Panzer Division, the closest armor reserve to the beaches, should serve as a warning to unbridled generalizations about German combat superiority. Despite early warnings of Allied landings nearby, the 21st Panzer spent most of D-Day going nowhere, constantly switching missions and dividing its forces into small packets, until finally just before dark mounting a half-hearted counterattack that failed.
Kershaw's conclusions that on D-Day German commanders missed the narrow opportunity when victory was possible is highly suspect. He writes, "not only did the German army choose not to commit its prime resources to crush the invasion when it was achievable, it continued to fight the following battle with its logistic arm quite literally tied behind its back." While Kershaw does a good job dispelling the myth that Hitler personally held back reinforcements at the critical moment, he ascribes far too much potential to the German 15th Army in the Pas-de-Calais. While asserting that the 15th Army - which was initially held out of the D-Day fighting in anticipation of other Allied landings - could have intervened quickly and decisively to tip the battle in Germany's favor, he fails to note that this army was composed mostly of unmotorized infantry units that were slow to reposition. Nor could German logistics be significantly upgraded in Normandy once the invasion began. While the Germans might have moved more men and equipment into the D-Day battle quicker than occurred historically, Kershaw avoids the issue of how these additional forces could have "won" the battle. In fact, the Germans had no answer to deal with Allied air superiority or naval gunfire and they could not mount serious, large-scale counterattacks under these conditions. Furthermore, there was only one German mobile division - the 21st Panzer - that was available to launch an immediate counterattack before the coastal defenses collapsed and this division could only have been used effectively against one of the eight Allied invasion divisions. Even under the best conditions, assuming that 21st Panzer moved rapidly to crush the British 6th Airborne, the Germans could only achieve tactical victories. Any German response would still have left seven Allied divisions in Normandy by D+1. Thus, while both sides could have improved their performances, the possibilities for German strategic victory in Normandy disappeared once the invasion began.
Well worth every penny

I have a couple of problems here
The Eastern Front in all it's utter brutality...Many books on this subject tend to make the summer of 1941 appear to be a cake-walk for the Germans. While I don't consider myself an expert, I'd always felt that '41 had to have been at least the EASIEST year for them. After reading Kershaw's book it is obvious that the Soviets provided no easy years. Although many authors have given convenient excuses for Hitler's failure to gain victory in '41, ie: the appearence of T-34/KV1 tanks, onset of winter, Hitler's bad decisions, etc. Kershaw's book makes it obvious that another factor must be considered, that is the tenacity and determination of the Soviet army.
One of the stories in the book is about a group of Russian wounded in no-mans-land, German medics attempt to provide aid, and the wounded fire at them, throw grenades and resist in any way possible. Although this behavior appears almost beyond comprehension, one must bear in mind that they were resisting an invader who to them had attacked without provocation.
As others have pointed out, much of Kershaw's accounts come from the German side, the reason for that is this IS a book about the German side of that war. That said, he provides a good amount of info and accounts from the Soviet side as well, making the book, I felt very balanced. I feel the book is a great, fast-paced read that actually puts a "face" on the brutality and horror of the first year of the greatest conflict this world has seen.
Born To Die

a hobo stew with Jack London: paid in advance
read it before you buy any other book
Simply The Best

A new Great Legend of WW2
Wonderful Overview Of Campaign Along The Eastern Front!Like the TV series it is based on, this book is a spellbinding read! All the basics found in the other recent works is here in spades; a tragic misinterpretation of Soviet strength by the German high command, especially of the Russian troop reserves and manpower resources, which were a whopping three times as large as believed, the curious notion that by simply crushing the troops massed between the border and the Leningrad-Moscow-Crimea salient the German forces would thereby crush the communist government and send the country into anarchy, chaos, and ruin, and the profound German arrogance in believing they could master and quickly dominate this gargantuan nation of several hundred million in a short savage campaign lasting only a single season. Hitler and the German General Staff were consistently shocked and amazed by the continuing tenacity, resourcefulness, and endurance of an army they had presumed to have already beaten in the opening weeks of the campaign. As in the other tomes, he marvels as to how the Russians, after losing two million men in a single two-month period could rally itself, reorganized, re-outfit, and send another two million into combat so quickly. In so doing, he treads on well-covered ground.
Yet he also broaches other aspects of the war between the Soviet forces and the Wehrmacht not so well covered in the other books, and this adds immeasurably to the value and entertaining qualities of the book. For example, he makes the curious argument that it was the defeat of the German forces at the hands of the Russians that led to the Holocaust. The argument is curious given the fact that the systematic murder of both the indigenous and German Jewish populations in both Poland and elsewhere (including within Germany itself) had already begun in earnest before the turn in fortunes along the Eastern front. Of course, it appears to be true that the particular manner in which the Nazis approached the issue of the extermination of the Jews and others was profoundly influenced by the exigent circumstances caused by the disastrous campaign along the Eastern front, it seems specious to argue that it would not have happened had the Germans been victorious.
In matter of fact, it was a central canon of Nazi ideology that the Jews were central to the Aryan struggle, and it was this rabid belief in the reputed world-wide Jewish conspiracy against the Aryan race that was motivating them to exterminate the Jewish population, not the Wehrmacht's impending defeat at the hands of the Soviets. The primary reason for proceeding with Operation Barbarossa in the first place was to systematically exterminate the indigenous population through a three-pronged operation involving murder, slavery and starvation and subsequent use of the conquered land for future German settlement. Therefore, although one must admit the particular character of the Holocaust was influenced by what was happening along the eastern front, one wonders as to the reasons for this misguided and wrong-headed line of argument.
Rees is absolutely correct, however, in arguing that the nature of the conflict was biblical in its magnitude, ferocity, and endurance. The climatic conditions, including the most severe winter fighting ever recorded, were unprecedented. The lack of supplies and the consequent hunger, hand to hand fighting, in which the Germans soldiers were aghast at the willingness of the Russians to fight with almost bestial ferocity, and the intense continuing artillery barrage used by both sides all support Rees contention that this was the battle of the century. My recommendation is that your read this along with the books mentioned above. Doing so will leave you with a much better understanding of the war along the Eastern front and better appreciated how the Russians did so much to help win the European theater of the Second World War. Enjoy!
AddendumIn the first editions of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" he wrote: "If Germany ever gets involved in a war with the Soviet Union, that will be the end of Germany". He was right, of course, and the sentence was deleted in later editions. Why did he start the war? He believed it to be inevitable, so he attacked when the Russians were unprepared.


Magisterial, a model biographyParticuarly valuable is Kershaw's concept of "working towards the Fuhrer," and the idea of cumulative radicalization. With full acknowledgements to his scholarly mentors and colleagues Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen, Kershaw notes how Hitler systematically undermined the normal structures of German government. The cabinet did not meet after 1938, the bureaucratic structures lost their authority, and months would go by as Hitler ignored vital issues and instead let competing factions fight it out among themselves. As a result crucial questions like the move towards a war economy in 1937 occurred not by design but as a result of this chaotic regime. The result was that Nazi Germany, apparently the heir to the cruel efficiency of Prussian bureaucracy, had an amazingly flawed bureaucratic regime. The victory of America, Britain and Russia over Italy, Japan and Germany was as much a victory of superior bureaucracy as it was of armies. Kershaw notes how Nazi officials squabbles among themselves and how they spent six months inconclusively debating whether to ban horse racing. Germany did not even try to solve its critical labor shortages by getting rid of domestic servants until the last few months of war, and by then vested interests made sure that it would be largely ineffective.
The consequence was to encourage the most radical groups among the Nazis and those who supported the most vicious alternatives. It was radicals who took the initiative in the anti-Church struggle and it was their momentum which led to Krystallnacht, the ghettoization and Poland, and ultimately the Holocaust. This is not to say that Hitler did not order or encourage the Holocaust. On this issue he was the most radical of the radicals, even if it was Heydrich who was crucial to putting it into practice. "It had consisted of authorizing more than directing." says Kershaw. But his account of how the genocide combined a dialectic of local initiative, central authority and wide government consensus, as we move from the euthanasia program to the first Polish atrocities, to the abandonment of the Madagascar Plan to the Einzatzgruppen and the setting up of the extermination camps, provides an account that makes horrible, yet scholarly impeccable reading.
One area where Hitler did have a large amount of authority was on military strategy, and Kershaw provides a nuanced account of Hitler's skill as a military leader. As a military leader Hitler's intuitiions were no worse than Stalin's and Churchill's. On questions like the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the attack on Czechoslovakia and the successful war against France Hitler was successful despite the opposition of much of the military. In his largest single mistake, the attack on the Soviet Union, the military shared his dangerous over-optimism. What hampered Hitler as a military leader was not so much his flaws but an ideological fanaticism that prevented him from taking other people's advice and from delegating authority. Even worse than this was a hatred of the Soviet Union which led Hitler to start a war that would have been extremely difficult for him to win. After he started losing his belligerent refusals to retreat may have hastened German defeat. But after Stalingrad and definitely after Kursk he could not have possibly have won and the major problem with his military strategy is that any negotiated peace would have required his removal. For obvious reasons this was not an option for Hitler.
And so we go to the final pages as Kershaw details how Germany was bombed into rubble while Hitler continued his Wagnerian rantings. Gradually the area under his control slips away and his followers fall away or are cut off and we see the final pathetic man behind the hideously empty solipsist. Hitler, Kershaw properly reminds us, was not insane. This makes his death at least, somewhat more satisfying.
Springtime for Hitler 2The first volume, Hubris 1889-1936, deals with Hitler's origins, various incarnations, and initial rise to power in 1936. This volume ends with Hitler's controversial invasion of the Rhineland. The second volume, Nemesis: 1936-1945, immediately picks up where the first leaves off, and takes us through the escalating war to its inevitable conclusion just outside a bunker in Berlin within range of the Soviet's artillery. Throughout both, we walk uncomfortably close to Adolph Hitler, and his minions.
The overall work takes us through Hitler's full life in astonishing and carefully researched detail, clarifying and confirming what we knew, but more importantly debunking myths and leaving open to speculation events still without a definitive resolution. Where the author doesn't know and is forced to guess based upon what he does know, the reader is clearly informed. This is not often the case in many biographies and is a credit to this work.
Throughout, the reader will come away with a sense of the "history as close-call," as Hitler approaches total failure and obscurity several times only to move on to what will become his fateful destiny for both himself and the world. Like a good novel the author allows us to speculate on our own on what might have been if for example, Hitler had been admitted to the school of architecture in Vienna. The author builds suspense and drama throughout.
The second longer volume is a quicker and easier read, despite the occasionally gruesome subject matter. Nemesis takes us methodically through World War II. We are there for every decision, every triumph, and every failure. The slow unfolding of the war and the eventual turn of the tide against Germany is developed again with a keen sense of drama. The author develops the narrative as if we don't know what's going to happen next or how it will all end and does a fine job of it.
As one might expect, both volumes require a large emotional investment. But it is worth it if you are to understand much about where we are today and how we got here. If you were to ask yourself before you read these works and after, what shaped the twentieth century, you might very well arrive at two very different answers. It is often interesting to speculate on how the world would look today if there had been no Hitler. Fortunately the author spares us that speculation.
Many biographies to detriment stray from the subject matter to dwell on the peripheral matters with only remote ties to the subject matter. Not so here, the author rarely cuts way from his Hitler himself and even then only briefly. Very quickly we are back at Hitler's side watching over his shoulder or through the eyes of those around him. The author binds us to Hitler throughout making it clear that it is not always comfortable or safe to be in the room when Hitler loses his temper.
The Kershaw freely admits it was never his intent to write a biography of Hitler, and he is not enamoured of his subject. He takes an odious subject and brings it to life. This makes for an interesting well written, but ultimately disturbing biography of the man of the century.
The Best Biography to Date....Period!

Dogs, Dogs, Dogs
Powerful, gripping tales of nature and survivalThe other stories are also powerful tales of survival (or demise) in the face of nature's harshness. I feel I am not alone in saying that I cannot recall most of the stories I had to read in school in my younger years but I distinctly recall "To Build a Fire." London's real, visceral language and description is hard to forget, as is the human pride and stupidity that characterizes the protagonist--London seems to be saying that we must respect and understand nature in order to survive and prosper. The protagonist's demise is more comical than tragic because of his lack of understanding and appreciation for the harsh realities of his environment. All of the stories bear the same general themes as the two I have mentioned. In each, man or beast is forced to battle against nature; survival is largely determined by each one's willingness or freedom to recede into primitiveness and let the blood of his ancestors rise up within his veins. Those who refuse to give in to their lowest instincts and who do not truly respect nature do not survive. I feel that London sometimes went a little overboard in "The Call of the Wild" when describing Buck's visions and instinctual memories of his ancestors among the first men, but his writing certainly remains compelling and beautiful, an important reminder to those of us today who are soft and take nature for granted that nature must be respected and that even her harshest realities are in some ways beautiful and noble, and that the law of survival applies just as much to us as it does to the beasts of the field.
Wonderful

Thrilling dive into Nazi darkness
A Photographic Journey Into The Hell Of Nazi Atrocities!This is a cautionary (and absolutely historically accurate) tale, made especially relevant in the year 2000 by the recent "ethnic cleansing" barbarism in Bosnia and Kosovo, of what can happen when people begin to surrender to the worst impulses of the social realm, and decide to ignore, or stand aside, or to pretend they just don't see where it is all leading. It has something to teach us about the very real dangers associated with unleashing the politics of hate, of what happens when ordinary citizens let other groups break the law to bully and terrorize minorities, when we let the central Government get out of control. History, as told in this excellent book, can teach us about how easily we humans succumb to subconscious evil, and seem to passively slip, almost without really deciding to, down the social and political slope to easy excuses and euphemisms, toward depravity, torture, and genocide. This is a book I highly recommend, although given its provocative and graphic photographic contents I would use caution about limiting its viewing by younger readers.
a good overview of the subject
Kershaw's book is concise and objective. He clearly illustrates the actions fought, and draws sound conclusions on how and why German successes were achieved, as well as failiures. It is one of the best chronicles of battle at the Kampfgruppe level that this reader has encountered.
Numerous personal recollections are drawn upon, enlivening the academic recital of operational details. It is also supported by a generous selection of maps and photos that complement the text.
Detailed and very readable at the same time, it must rank among the foremost works on the battle for the crucial bridges targeted in Market Garden.